This work is devoted to the question of the optimal allocation of electricity production resources within several production technologies. We consider the equilibrium of the realtime electricity market which is effected by the competition of different power generators. For this equilibrium, the best bid strategies of electricity producers are obtained which yields for each technology the optimal amount of production capacity to be installed.
Introduction
The introduction of competition to electricity production and trading which recently has been effected around the world, rises a number of interesting problems concerning the market organization, the risk estimation, and the question of best strategies for power producers. This work is addressed to the last problem. The basic point here is that after the liberalization, the production capacities are to optimize with respect to new requirements: each market participant has to take into account the randomness of electricity demand and the impact of his competitors on electricity price to decide how much production capacity to install and how to allocate it along different types of generators (typically to find the right proportion of base-load and peak-load generators). Moreover, the electricity producer has to establish an optimal production plan for each generator type depending on the electricity price. In this work, we consider the optimization of a portfolio consisting of diverse electricity production units which are utilized at the the real-time market for electricity. We suppose that the trading rules obey the requirements of the pay as bid auction. Let us explain how it works. A real-time electricity market is different from a commodity spot market since it must match demand and supply continuously to maintain the network electrical equilibrium. The electricity system price is adjusted hourly by the system operator by the following procedure: Each electricity producer submits for each hour of the next day his schedules consisting of a bid quantity and a bid price for power which he is willing to sell at this price. The system operator arranges the bids for each hour in the increasing price order. The system price set for the current hour equals to the bid price of the last generator needed to meet the demand. Those producers who are in merit (i.e. whose bid price was below or equal to the system price) supply power and obtain their own bid price. Other producers suffer a loss since the fixed costs for their idle production capacities are to pay. Qualitatively, a producer has to solve the following individual optimization problem: the bid price is to place in such a way, that the potential gain of production is optimally balanced against the possible loss of being idle. This decision depends on the cumulative bid quantity submitted by the competitors below his bid price, on the distribution of the electricity demand, but also on the production technology: for a base-load generator (high fixed, low variable costs) the optimal bid price is lower than that for a peakload generator (low fixed, high variable cost). The experiences with competitive electricity markets show that the simultaneous individual bid optimization seems to drive the market to an equilibrium such that each production technology achieves a price interval where bids exclusively from this technology are placed. Moreover, within each price interval, there seems to be a fixed total amount of bid quantity. This issue indicates that each electricity production technology possesses a uniquely determined total amount of capacity to be optimally installed at the market. If so and if such an equilibrium is unique, then a producer may optimize the allocation of his production capacities along different technologies as follows: Calculate for each technology the total equilibrium amount of capacity to be optimally installed and compare it to the actually existing capacity. Increase the own capacities for those technologies where a shortage is determined until the optimal equilibrium amount is reached at the market.
Reduce at the same time own capacities of those technologies, where excess occurs.
Let us mention other work on modeling of deregulated electricity markets. The paper [4] is devoted to the questions of pricing the electricity derivatives. An economical mechanism of electricity price formation is discussed in [1] and the statistical properties of real-world prices are considered in [8] . The work [5] discusses system price distribution for a single-technology real-time market. In [6] , we prove the existence and the uniqueness of market equilibrium for the system-marginal-price electricity auction, where in difference to the pay-as-bid auction, each producer who is in merit sells the electricity at the system price. An economic comparison of both auction types is found in [3] .
Minimal-saturated installed capacities
Our concept of equilibrium is based on the following consideration: after all producers have submitted their schedules, the system operator determines the production capacity I(p) installed at the price p ≥ 0 summing up all amounts of bids with bid price less or equal p.
The non-decreasing installed capacity I(·) is saturated, if renting a small production unit of some technology to submit a schedule at a price p is not better than doing nothing. The idea here is that in the real market, the installed capacity must always be saturated since on the contrary some additional producers will submit schedules until the saturation is reached.
Moreover, the list of bids must be minimal-saturated in the sense that removing an arbitrary bid, the saturation gets lost.
Let us make the notion of the minimal-saturated installed capacity mathematically precise.
Denote by Q the electricity demand within one hour and agree that Q is a non-negative random variable on a probability space (Ω, F, P ) with distribution function F such that
is strictly increasing and continuous.
Suppose that the distribution of Q is known to all producers. Assume that N ∈ N different technologies are used at the electricity market where p 
for the set of all bid prices which are acceptable by the system operator. Let us suppose that J is a discrete set since the money unit is not infinitely divisible.
Note that J may be bounded due to a price cap. Let c > 0 (MWh) be the capacity amount of a small rentable production unit belonging to the technology i = 1, . . . , N . Then, for the non-decreasing installed capacity I : J → [0, ∞[, the income of the additional producer depends on his strategy to rent the unit of the technology i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and to submit a schedule at the price p ∈ J which yields a random gain
or to be idle which gives a non-random gain of zero: G I (idle) = 0.
Remark Note that the gain G I (p, i) can be modeled in this way only if c is small in the sense that one can neglect the power surplus which may occur after the unit is switched on.
This ensures that the whole production is sold as the unit runs. We suppose that for each technology, there exists a rentable unit of such small capacity c > 0. This assumption is justified by the observation that in reality, there exists a market for diverse agreements on free electricity production capacity and the corresponding contracts are not constrained to a physical production unit. Hence, the capability to rent an (abstract) unit of capacity c > 0 of arbitrary technology seems not to be a strong assumption. However, the critical point here is to assume that the market price for renting the unit will be equal to the unit's fixed costs, which is economically justified in the long-run average.
Suppose that the risk aversion of the additional producer is described by the strictly increasing concave utility function U ∈ C(R), giving the utility functional U I which evaluates his strategies by
for the case if a schedule is submitted and U I (idle) = E(U (G I (idle))) = U (0) otherwise.
Definition 1. A non-decreasing installed capacity
for the additional producer with c, (p
Intuitively, the item a) of this definition says that for minimal-saturated installed capacity, the best strategy is to be idle, since either the price is too low to cover the production costs or there is already a sufficient amount of capacity at this price. However, the item b) says that if there is a capacity I(p) > 0 at the price p, then removing an arbitrary small amount of bids below p we obtain an installed capacityĨ with 0 <Ĩ(p) < I(p) such that there exists a technology i ∈ {1, . . . , N } which could be profitable placed at p since
Hence, a) ensures that I is saturated while b) serves that it is in fact minimal-saturated.
Remark Let us stress that the Definition 1 implies that all market participants estimate their risk in terms of the 'marginal utility'. 1 In fact, a) of this definition means that no electricity producer adds the position G(p, i) to his own portfolio if the additional producer (without any position) prefers to be idle than to follow (p, i). Clearly, this point of view neglects all existing portfolios, since otherwise one would postulate instead of a) in the Definition 1 that for each market participant k = 1, . . . , K at the equilibrium holds
The author thank to referees for pointing out this question.
where X k denotes the equilibrium revenue and U k the utility function of the agent k . However, the above equation follows from a) of the Definition 1 by neglecting the revenue X k := 0 to consider merely the marginal income G I (p, i) and by supposing that
for all k = 1, . . . , K meaning that the additional producer is the least risk-averse market player. In this sense, our modeling is not completely compatible to the utility-based point of view. Still, the minimal-saturated installed capacity reflects the equilibrium of a market where all producers estimate their risk separately for each submitted MWh using the strategy of the additional producer as a margin for the maximal risk which can be incurred.
The minimal-saturated installed capacity is unique and is obtained explicitely. Let us introduce the following functions:
The intuition behind these functions comes from the observation that for p > p
is equivalently transformed to
That is, a minimal saturated installed capacity I should satisfy (5) 
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (1), (2) for an additional producer with c, (p
f i , p v i ) N i=1 , U
as above there exists a unique minimal-saturated installed capacity I
Proof. Let us show that the formula (6) indeed defines a minimal-saturated installed capacity. 
, and from (6) we have
Let us show the uniqueness. Suppose thatĨ is some minimal-saturated installed capacity 
let us notice this as 
Combining (8) and (9) 
Optimal allocation of production capacity
Let us now turn to the question, how much capacity is to install for each technology to reach the equilibrium. We have to determine those areas in J , where all bids from the technology i ∈ {1, . . . N } are placed.
Definition 2. We say that p ∈]p f v , ∞[∩J is occupied by the technology
j ∈ {1, . . . , N } if (10) U (0) = U I * (p, j).
We say that p ∈]p f v , ∞[∩J is strictly occupied by the (uniquely determined) technology
Again, this definition is justified by the observation, that if p is occupied by j , then removing a small amount of bids below p from I * , we obtain an installed capacityĨ with 0 <Ĩ(p) < I * (p) where it's still worth offering a bid at p for the technology j as UĨ(p, j) >
. Similarly, if p is strictly occupied by j ∈ {1, . . . , N } then we see that at p, only the technology j can survive since removing a sufficiently small amount of bids below p from I * , we obtainĨ with
to see that only j can be placed profitable at p:
For each J ⊂ J we denote by µ * (J ) the total capacity amount of J , where µ * is the measure on P(J) given by µ * ({p}) = I * (p) − max{I * (p ) : p ∈ J, p < p} for all p ∈ J . The total capacity amounts (C * i ) N i=1 to be installed at the equilibrium for technologies i = 1, . . . , N are not uniquely determined, since µ * ({p}) may come from each technology which occupies p.
Still, this uncertainty is not crucial and we shall agree with
It turns out that the prices occupied by a technology form an interval. Consequently, we find an optimal capacity allocation calculating increments of I * on the corresponding intervals. 
defines an optimal capacity allocation.
The proof is based on the fact that two functions f i , f j for i = j intersect at most once in the sense of (ii) from the following 
